By The Beachwood Book Club
Heraldo Muñoz, the ambassador-permanent representative of Chile to the United Nations, is in town today to discuss his new book, A Solitary War: A Diplomat’s Chronicle of the Iraq War and Its Lessons, at an event with the Board of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Muñoz is the former president of the UN Security Council and chairman of the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Here is the introduction to Solitary War.
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On Sunday, January 30, 2005, an upbeat President George W. Bush spoke from the Cross Hall of the White House to congratulate the Iraqi people on their successful election of delegates to a National Assembly. The election had signified the launch of an unprecedented democratic process in the country. The Iraqis, defying terrorist threats that had created an atmosphere of insecurity, had gone to the polls in massive numbers to exercise their sovereign right to vote.
During his speech, President Bush specifically thanked the United Nations, an organization that he described as having provided “important assistance in the election process.” Months later, in September 2005, at a packed UN General Assembly meeting attended by more than 150 world leaders, President Bush thanked the UN once more for having “played a vital role in the success of the January elections” in Iraq, and for supporting the drafting of a new constitution. He then requested that the United Nations “continue to stand by the Iraqi people as they complete the journey to a fully constitutional government.”
By contrast, about three years before, in October 2002, Bush had warned the UN that failure to act against the Saddam Hussein regime would lead the organization “to betray its founding and prove irrelevant to the problems of our time.” And in the run-up to the invasion, on March 17, 2003, Bush had severely criticized the UN Security Council for not “living up to its responsibilities.”
These disparities in the American stance toward the UN were due to the late recognition that the UN was the only legitimate institution able to broker a viable alternative to permanent military occupation so that the United States could begin disengaging, at least politically, from Iraq. The Bush administration’s plans for a transition to an interim Iraqi government had been soundly rejected by the Iraqis in 2003. A key player in the process, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, had even refused to meet with any American official! So, at the request of the United States, the United Nations stepped in to consult with all concerned parties and develop a solution to hand sovereignty back to an interim government, one that was chosen largely by UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. This set in motion an unprecedented democratic transition process, which completed its first key stage in the January 30, 2005 elections, followed by the approval of the new constitution in October 2005.
Posted on June 12, 2008